5 factors in the Pentagon's miscalculation of Iraqi resistance

As the US media was beating the war drums over the past few months, there was a general consensus by the mass of pundits regularly spouting their wisdom that, justification for this war aside, once the conflict began, it would be swift and decisive. The common argument took into account the dismal performance of the Iraqi military during the first Gulf War twelve years ago, along with the fact that Iraq is much weaker militarily now than it had been then. This combined with the assured joy of all Iraqis at the site of the young men from Kansas and Texas srengthened the conviction that the actual invasion and takeover of Iraq was going to be a cakewalk. Most of the focus of concern, if there had been any at all, was on the long military occupation that was to follow.

As President Bush reminded his countrymen and women today, it's barely been a week since the invasion began. And the vast power of the US military, the most technically powerful fighting force in the history of humankind, may yet prove to be overwhelming in the next few days.

However, the obvious failure in accurately assessing the effectiveness of Iraqi resistance stems from a disregard for the following factors:

1. Unlike 1991, Saddam Hussein and his advisers have been planning for this US invasion for twelve years. In the first Gulf War, Hussein made the disastrous miscalculation that the United States would not repel his invasion of Kuwait. This was based on a variety of factors, including the fact that (a) the US was--at the time--a strong ally (those old enough will remember reading about how his suave ambassador in Washington, Saadoon Hamadi, was one of the most popular VIP's at the capital's exclusive parties) and (b) he received what he understood to be the all clear from US Ambassador April Glaspie on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait. When Bush the Elder perceived Hussein as getting too powerful by trying to get his hands on Kuwaiti (and potentially other Gulf countries') oil resources, and assembled an international coalition backed by the United Nations, this came as a shocking suprise to the Iraqi leadership. Ever since, Hussein and his henchmen learned no to make the same mistake. As a Times of London piece published today points out, Iraqi war planners have been meticulously studying the US experiences in Somalia, Lebanon, and Vietnam.

2. The obvious: this war is being waged on Hussein's home turf, not in a place like Kuwait that, despite its proximity, was unfamiliar to Iraqi soldiers.

3. For all their talk about his brutality, the Bush administration misjudged the level of control the Baath Party wields in Iraq. Iraq is not like Afghanistan or Somalia (and the US is failing in the former, and was humiliated in the latter), where a bunch of ragtag factions were fighting among themselves. Saddam Hussein's Baath Party has had decades to perfect its methods. I remember that even back in the 1980's, when Reagan/Bush were keen on helping their then-friend stop the tide of Islamic revolution in Iran, the Baath Party had such authority that Iraqi university students here in the United States lived in fear that Baath agents would get them if they went out of line. The Iraqi regime is entrenched at all levels of society.

4. No matter how strong the regime, the people's desire for liberation will eventually triumph. But are American and British soldiers the right catalyst for liberation. The last time the Shi'is in the South revolted, in the aftermath of the last Gulf War, they were abandoned by the US. The United States government, with its open policy of supporting the most extreme elements in Israel (Bush calling Sharon a "man of peace" as he was massacring Palestinians is still vivid for most Arabs), is not exactly trusted by most Iraqis. Neither are the British, who started this whole mess by artificially carving countries on the Middle Eastern map, fondly remembered.

5. People generally don't like being invaded. Even though Bush Jr. was not popularly elected, most Americans would still rise to defend their country against aggression. Why should most Iraqis be any different?

As Robert Fisk wrote in The Independent yesterday, "The Americans could be outside Baghdad. But in military terms they might as well be in Kuwait."